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POlYGRAPH EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
In State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31 (C.P. Cuyahoga 
Cty. 1977), Judge Hitchcock, in granting a petition for 
post-conviction relief, held that a criminal defendant 
had a right to have polygraph evidence admitted 
under certain circumstances. The Sims court rested 
its decision on two grounds: First, the court found the 
polygraph had attained a sufficient measure of reli-
ability to warrant the introduction into evidence of 
the results of an examination conducted by a com-
petent examiner. Second, the court held that the 
defendant had a constitutional right to have poly-
graph evidence amittted in his behalf. This article 
examines the constitutional and evidentiary issues 
surrounding the admissibiiity of poiygraph evidence. 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence 
Ohio has adopted the majority view with respect to 
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Before such 
evidence may be admitted, the proponent must 
establish that the forensic technique has "gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs." This "general acceptance" test is derived 
from Frye v. United States, 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 293 
F. 1013 (1923), the first reported case on the poly-
graph. The Frye court stated: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery 
crosses the line between the experimental 
and demonstrable stages is difficultto define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, 
and while courts will go a long way in 
admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery,the thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs. 
/d. at 1 014. The court went on to hold that the 
polygraph had "not yet gained such standing and 
scientific recognition among physiological and psy-
chological authorities ... " to warrant admission into 
evidence. ld See generally C. McCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972). 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
The "general acceptance" test has been used in 
Ohio as the standard for determining the admissi-
bility of a variety of scientific techniques. State v. 
0/derman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N£2d 442 
(Cuyahoga Cty. 1975) (voiceprints); State v. Holt, 17 
Ohio St.2d 81, 85, 246 N.E.2d 365,367, (1969) 
("Neutron Activation Analysis has not yet reached 
the point of generally proven reliability .... ")The 
"general acceptance" test has also been employed in 
a number of polygraph cases. State v. Towns, 35 Ohio 
App.2d 237, 64 Ohio Ops.2d 371, 301 N.E.2d 700 
(Franklin Cty. 1973) ("lie detector test has not yet 
attained scientific acceptance."); State v. Hill, 40 
Ohio App.2d 16, 69 Ohio Ops.2d 9, 317 N.E.2d 233 
(Montgomery Cty. 1963) (polygraph has not received 
"scientific recognition"); State v. Smith, 113 Ohio 
App. 461, 463, 18 Ohio Ops.2d 19, 178 N.E.2d 605 
(Lucas Cty. 1960) ("lie detector has not yet attained 
scientific acceptance"); Parker v. Friendt, 99 Ohio 
App. 329, 338, 59 Ohio Ops. 112, 118 N.E.2d 216 
(Cuyahoga Cty. 1954) (polygraph inadmissible be-
cause of lack of "general scientific recognition and 
public acceptance.") 
The general prohibition of polygraph evidence also 
extends to references at trial concerning the fact that 
a witness has taken a polygraph examination and to a 
witness' willingness or refusal to take an exam-
ination. State v. Hegel, 9 Ohio App.2d 12, 38 Ohio 
Aps Ops.2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 666 (Montgomery Cty. 
1964) ("Neither a professed willingness nor a refusal 
to submit to such a test should be admitted"); State v. 
Smith, 113 Ohio App. 461, 18 Ohio Ops.2d 19, 178 
N.E.2d 605 (LucasCty. 1960).Seegenerally, Annota-
tion, Propriety and Prejudical Effect of Comment or 
Evidence as to Accused's Willingness to Take Lie 
Detector Test, 95 A.L.R.2d 818 (1964). 
Admissibility by Stipulation 
The total exclusion of polygraph evidence has 
come under attack in recent years. The most signifi-
cant inroads have occurred in cases in which the par-
ties have stipulated to the admission of the results of 
a polygraph examination. In State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 
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274, 371 P.2d. 894 (1962). theleading stipulation 
case, the Arizona Supreme Court found the poly-
graph had "developed to a state in which its results 
are probative enough to warrant admissibility upon 
stipulation." 371 P.2d at 900. The same result was 
reached in State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis.2d 730,216 
N.W.2d 8 (1974), in which the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held the polygraph had attained."such degree 
of standing and scientific recognition that uncondi-
tional rejection of expert testimony based on poly-
graph testing is no longer indicated." 216 N.W.2d at 
13. See generally, Annotation, Admissibility of Lie 
Detector Test Taken Upon Stipulatiortthatthe Result 
be Admissible in Evidence, 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). 
Ohio case law on this point is sparse. In State v. 
Hill, 40 Ohio App.2d 16, 69 Ohio Ops. 9, 317 N.E.2d 
233 (Montgomery Cty. 1963), the court rejected the 
admissibility of polygraph evidence upon stipulation. 
In a later case, State v. Towns, 35 Ohio App.2d 237, 
64 Ohio Ops.2d 371, 301 N.E.2d 700 (Franklin Cty. 
1973), the court took the opposite position: "(W)here 
the parties stipulate in writing to take such tests and 
be bound, thereby, and where, pursuant to such 
stipulation, such test is properly given, the results of 
such tests are admissible at trial." 35 Ohio App.2d at 
246. Dictum in In re Collins, 20 OhioApp.2d 319,49 
Ohio Ops.2d 448, 253 N.E.2d 824 (Cuyahoga Cty. 
1969), supports ihe Towns decision. in Coiiins the 
court stated: "(L)ie detector tests are ordinarily in-
admissible absent knowing agreement as to admit-
ting the test by both sides." 20 Ohio App.2d at 322. 
The Trend Toward Full Admissibility 
Some courts have gone beyond the stipulation 
cases and admitted the results of polygraph 
examinations in the absence of a pretrial agree-
ment. In United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 
(E.D. Mich. 1972), for example, a federal district 
court found the theory of the polygraph "sound" and 
the results of an examination admissible under 
certain conditions. Similarly, in People v. Cutter, 12 
Crim. L. Rep. 2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), the court 
admitted polygraph evidence during a suppression 
hearing after finding the "polygraph now enjoys 
general acceptance among authorities, including 
psychologists and researchers . . . as well as 
polygraph examiners." /d. at 2134. Other cases 
admitting polygraph evidence include: State v. 
Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213,278 A.2d 543 
(Hudson Cty. 1971) (admissible for sentencing); 
Walther v. O'Connell, 72 N.Y. Misc.2d 316, 
339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Queens Civ. Ct. 1972); Matter 
of Stenzel, 71 Misc.2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 
(Niagara Fam. Ct. 1972). 
In addition to the above cases, several appellate 
decisions have indicated that a trial court has dis-
cretion to admit or reject polygraph evidence. The 
leading case on this issue is Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974), in which the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held poly-
graph evidence admissible if: (1) the defendant 
agrees in advance to the admission of test results, 
irrespective of the outcome of the examination, and 
(2) the trial judge conducts a "close and searching 
inquiry into the qualifications of the examiner, the 
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fitness of the defendant for such examination, and 
the methods utilized in conducting the tests." /d. at 
124. See also United States v.lnfelice, 506 F.2d 1358 
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); 
United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Chastain, 435 F.2d 686 (7th 
Cir. 1970); United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 
1360 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Watts, 502 F.2d 
726 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alvarez, 472 
F.2d 111 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). 
Prior to Sims, only one other reported Ohio case 
admitted polygraph evidence absent a stipulation 
betwe_er. the parties. In State v. Hancock, 71 Ohio 
Ops.2d 458 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1974), the court 
admitted the results of a polygraph examination after 
concluding that the "time has come to recognize that 
the wholesale exclusion of lie detector tests results 
for want of scientific acceptance and proved reli-
ability is not supported by the facts." /d. at 466. 
Constitutional Arguments 
Several constitutional grounds have been offered 
to support the admissibility of polygraph evidence. In 
State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532, P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 
1975), aff'd. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975), a 
New Mexico appellate court held the admission of 
polygraph evidence was required by the due process 
clause. The Dorsey opinion relies on Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which a state's 
evidentiary rules - precluding a party from impeach-
ing its own witness and excluding declaratjons 
against penal interests as a hearsay exception -
operated to prevent the introduction of defense 
evidence. According to the United States Supreme 
Court, such a result violated due process: Under the 
Chambers rationale, a defendant has a right to 
present critical and reliable defense evidence. Dor-
sey merely applied Chambers to the polygraph. 
To the extentS1ins recognizes a constitutional right 
to present polygraph evidence, it follows Dorsey. The 
Sims court, however, relied on the confrontation 
rather than due process clause. The Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that 
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtail}!ng 
witnesses in his favor ... ". This right has been 
applied to the states_ through the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14 (1967). In addition, Section 10, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution reads: "In any trial. in any 
court, the party accused shall be allowed ... to have 
compulsory process to procure the attendance of 
witnesses in his behalf ... " Based upon these 
provisions, the Sims court held that a criminal 
defendant, at least in certain cases, "has a right to be 
examined by a competent, experienced polygraph 
operator whose reputation for truth and veracity is 
unblemished, and if the examiner is able to reach a 
conclusion which favors the defendant's view of the 
issues, to have compulsory process for his testimony 
as a witness." 52 Ohio Misc. at 42. Support for this 
position can be found in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Washington in which Chief Justice Warren 
wrote: 'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, 
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in 
plain terms the right to present a defense ... "/d. at 
19. Thus, once the results of polygraph examinations 
are found to be reliable, the accused has a constitu-
tional right .to "present a defense" in the form of a 
polygraph examiner. 
A different constitutional argument was offered in 
United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971 ). In Hart a federal district court ruled results of 
a polygraph examination of a government witness 
which indicated deception were admissible under 
the Brady doctrine. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), the United States Supreme Court held the 
withholding of favorable and material defense evi-
dence by the prosecution after it had been requested 
by the defense violated due process. The Hart court 
interpreted Brady as requiring the disclosure of 
"any evidence which may tend to exculpate the 
defendant." 344 F. Supp. at 523. Because the gov-
ernment initially thought the polygraph sufficiently 
reliable to conduct an examination of its witness, it 
had the burden, according to the court of explaining 
why the test results should now be excluded. Hart 
was subsequently followed in State v. Christopher, 
134 N.J. Super. 263, 339 A.2d 239 (1975), which 
held the government's administration of a polygraph 
test constituted an implied stipulation to admit the 
results. 
Enforceability of Pretrial Agreement 
In a few reported cases prosecutors have gone 
beyond stipulating to the admissibility of test results 
and have agreed to the dismissal of charges if the 
defendant successfully passes a polygraph examina-
tion. Notwithstanding such an agreement some 
prosecutors have initiated proceedings even when 
the defendant passed the examination. Several ap-
pellate courts have held that the prosecutor is bound 
by such an agreement. In State v. Davis, 188 So.2d 
24 (Fla. App. 1966), for example, the court found that 
the agreement was "(a) pledge of public faith - a 
promise made by state officials- and one that should 
not be lightly disregarded." /d. at 27. Accord, People 
v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975); 
Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla. App. 1969). This 
position is supported by the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Santobel/o v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257 (1971), in which the Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction because the prosecution failed to 
keep its part of a negotiated plea agreement. See 
generally, Enforceability of Agreement by State Of-
ficials to Drop Prosecution if Accused Successfully 
Passes Polygraph Test, 36 A.L.R.3d 1280 (1971 ). 
Self-Incrimination 
The submission by an accused to a state-spon-
sored polygraph examination implicates the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. The Supreme 
Court addressed the fifth amendment aspects of 
polygraph examinations in Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757 (1966): 
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain 
physical evidence;' for example, lie detector 
tests measuring changes in body function 
during interrogation, may actually be direct-
ed to eliciting responses which are essen-
tially testimonial. To compel a person to 
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submit to testing in which an effort will be 
made to determine his guilt or innocence on 
the basis of physiological responses, whet-
her willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and 
history of the Fifth Amendment. 
/d. at 764. Thus, counsel must advise the defendant 
concerning the waiver of the privilege if the test 
results are to be admitted at trial. Some courts have 
required Miranda warnings to ensure that the de-
fendant's waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and-intel-
ligently made. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 
90, 97 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile, 313 N.E. 120, 127 (Mass. 1974). 
References 
A defense counsel who intends to use polygraph 
evidence, must be thoroughly familiar with the tech-
nique. Some of the better references on the subject 
include: J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEP-
TION (1966); MOENSSENS, MOSES, AND INBAU, 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (1973) 
(Chapter 14); N. ANSLEY (Ed.), LEGAL ADMISSI-
BILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH (1975); TARLOW, Ad-
missibility of Polygraph Evidence in 19 75: An Aid in 
Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 
26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Speedy Trial 
Defendant does not have to object to setting the 
trial past speedy trial limits. The Supreme Court 
reiterates the mandatory nature of the speedy trial 
provisions (R.C. 2945.71) and holds that when a trial 
date is set beyond the 90-day limitation, ·the defen-
dant, on motion, will be discharged. There is no 
requirement that the defendant object to the setting 
of the late date. This case, however, is to be contras-
ted with earlier cases where the date first set was 
within the proper time and was then continued. 
When the defendant did not object in those cases, the 
court ruled that discharge was not proper. State v. 
Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 1 03, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977). 
Burden of Proof- Insanity Defense 
Under the provisions of R.C. 2901.05(c)(2), a plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity is an affirmative 
defense. A defendant who pleads insanity only has 
the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence 
to raise that defense. He does not have the burden of 
establishing insanity by a preponderance of the 
evidence. When the defendant presents sufficient 
evidence to raise the defense, the state bears the 
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt 
upon every issue necessary to convict the defendant. 
Thus, the prosecution must prove defendant's sanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Humphries, 51 
Ohio St.2d 95 (1977). 
Alibi Allowed Despite lack of Notice 
Trial court was reversed for failing to allow alibi 
evidence even though defendant failed to give notice 
under Crim. R. 12.1. Because defense counsel acted 
in good faith (by giving other notice), prosecution was 
not surprised, and alibi was vital to defense, the trial 
court abused it discretion in not finding (as Crim. R. 
12.Ldirects), .. thaL''in. tbe. interest .oJ justice such 
evidence should be ad.mitted." State v. Smith, 50 
Ohio St.2d 51, 362 N.E.2d 988 (1977). 
Auto Search 
Police officers were summoned to a parking lot 
with information that men inside a particular car 
were armed with shotguns: On arrival, the officers 
ordered the men out of the car at which time they 
were frisked. One of the officers noticed a "bulging" 
case in the cc.:r, opened it, and found a revolver. 
Defendant admitted ownership and was subsequent-
ly indicted for carrying a conc:e<!Je.d yv~apon. fV1.otion 
to suppress granted by trail court. State appealed and 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Frisking justified under 
Terry doctrine but as safety of officers was then 
secured, no further justification for search existed. 
State v. Khail No. 36128, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. 
(1977). 
Same or Similar Offense Excluded 
Principal ground of appeal in rape case was the 
erroneous admission of evidence of similar acts. The 
Court of Appeals agreed but declined to reverse on 
the harmless error grounds. The case offers an 
excellent review of the "same or similar offense" 
statute (R.C. 2945.59) and the cases interpreting it. 
State v. ~Aiilliarnsl ~Jo. 35847, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. 
(1977). 
Speedy Trial 
This case contains a lengthy discussion of speedy 
trial, both from a statutory and a constitutional point 
of view. The most interesting part deals with time 
-computation in situations where there is a nolle 
prosequi or dismissal (through prosecutor's fault) of 
the indictment followed by reindictment. In such 
circumstances, the time awaiting trial under the first 
indictment is to be added to the time awaiting trial 
under the second indictment. The time between the 
first dismissal and the reindictment is not to be 
counted if the defendant, during that interval. is 
released without bail as no charge is then pending. 
State v. Stephens, No. 35247, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. 
(1977). 
Defendant's Presence During Trial 
Only the defendant, and not his counsel, can waive 
the defendant's right to be present at trial. Thus, 
defendant's conviction was reversed despite the fact 
that defendant's counsel and the prosecutor had 
stipulated that the trial could proceed in the defen-
dant's absence, and despite the fact that the trial 
court later explained what had occurred and asked 
the defendant if he objected, which he did not. The 
Court found that the such acquiescence did not 
clearly indicate that the defendant waived his right to 
be present. State v. Cunningham, No. 36153, Cuya-
hoga Cty. Ct. App. (1977). 
Sentencing and Cross Examination 
The trial court informed defendant's counsel atthe 
pretrial that although a presentence report would be 
considered if the defendant plead guilty, the defen-
dant would do some time if he elected to go to trial. 
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On appeal, the trial court's refusal to consider grant-
ing probation becaljse of the def13ndant's failure to 
plea bargain was held to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. Also, the Court held that the defendant 
must be allowed the opportunity to negate elements 
of the offense charged even if the questions asked to 
elicit such information are leading and even if the 
State properly objected to them as such. State v. 
Powell, No. 36406, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1977). 
Sentencing Procedure- Probationer's Rights 
Under the new Ohio Criminal Code, the sentence 
must be pronounced before a defendant can be 
placed on probation. Thus, instead of suspending the 
impo-sition of the sentence and placing the defendant 
on probation, the trial court should pronounce the 
sentence suspended and then place the defendant on 
probation. The court's failure in this case to provide 
written notice of the charges against the defendant, 
and its refusal to permit the defendant's mother to 
address the court violated due process guarantees 
specified in Morrisey v. Brewer as made applicable to 
probationers in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. Due process 
requires that the probationer be given written notice 
of the claimed violation and that he have the oppor-
t'unity to be heard in person and to present witnesses. 
State v. McKenzie. No. 37749, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. 
App. (1977). 
Duress Defense in Prison Escape 
Recognized- Voir Dire 
In a case of first impression for Ohio, the Court 
recognized that, under the proper facts, the defense 
of duress is available to a defendant charged with 
violating Ohio's escape statute. This defense, how-
ever, is limited by a requirement that the prisoner 
surrender himself to the authorities as soon as he 
has avoided the threatened harm. The Court also held 
that when a court itself conducts the voir dire 
examination in a criminal case pursuant to Crim. R. 
24(A), it is error to refuse counsel the opportunity to 
supplement the examination by personal inquiry of 
the prospective jurors. State v. Proctor, 51 Ohio 
App.2d 151 (1977). Ed Note: See Generally Anno-
tation, Duress, Necessity, or Conditions ot Confine-
ment as Justification for Escape from Prison, 69 
A.L.R.3d 678 (1976) .. 
Federal Rules of Evidence in Ohio 
The Court adopted the principles embodied in 
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) 
which provide that hearsay evidence is admissible, 
notwithstanding the absence of a specific exception, 
if: 
(1) the statement has circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness; 
(2) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact; 
(3) the statement is more probative than 
other available evidence which could be 
produced through reasonable efforts (there 
must be a clear showing of the absence of 
other available evidence and a showing of 
the necessity of its admission); 
(4) admissibility is clearly in the interst of 
justice; and 
(5) the offering party notifies the adverse 
party of its intention to offer such evidence. 
Erion v. Timken Co., 52 Ohio App.2d 123 (Franklin 
Cty. 1976). Ed. Note: Timken is one of the first Ohio 
cases to adopt a provision of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. The residual hearsay exception applied in 
Timken permits the trial judge to admit hearsay 
statements, not falling within a recognized excep-
tion, on an ad hoc basis. Confrontation clause prob-
lems would generally preclude the prosecution from 
using this exception. The Proposed Ohio Rules of 
Evidence also contain this exception. 
Ohio's Capital Punishment Statute 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the 
constitutionality of the Ohio death penalty statute in 
January. 22 Crim. L. Rep. 4130: The two cases before 
the Court are Bell v. Ohio, 48 Ohio St.2d 270, 358 
N.E.2d 556 (1976) and Locket v. Ohio, 49 Ohio St.2d 
48, 358 N.E.2d 1 0'62 (1976). The Ohio Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in an 
earlier case, State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 
N.E.2d 1035 (1976). See generally, State v. Bayless, 
Discretionary Defects May Still Remain in Ohio's 
Death Penalty Statutes, 4 Ohio !Vorthern L. Rev. 701 
(1977): Greggv. Georgia: Will the Ohio Death Penalty 
Survive?, -4 Ohio Northern L. Rev. 441 (1977). 
Right to Counsel at Lineups 
A rape victim's one-on-one identification _of an 
unindicted defendant at a preliminary heanng at 
which the defendant was not represented by counsel 
violated the defendant's right to counsel. The right to 
counsel under Wade and Gilbert had attached be-
cause the hearing took place after the initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings. Moore v. 
Illinois, 98 S. Ct. 458 (1977). 
Double Jeopardy - Lesser Included 
Offense in Municipality 
Where the same act or transaction contitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test 
for determining whether there were two offenses or 
merely one for purposes of the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other did 
not. In this case, defendant stole a car and was 
arrested after using it for 9 days. Defendant pleaded 
guilty to joyriding- the charge being based on the last 
day the car was used. Defendant was later charged 
with auto theft, a felony, based on the original taking 
of the car. Since joyriding is a lesser included offense 
of auto theft under Ohio law, the double jeopardy 
clause barred prosecution for auto theft. It was 
immaterial that the prosecution for auto theft was 
based on earlier events since no Ohio statute 
provides that joyriding is a separate offense for each 
day the car is operated without the owner's consent. 
Brown v. Ohio, __ U.S. __ , 53 L. Ed.2d 187 
(1977). 
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Defendant's Right to a Lineup 
The trial court has authority to order an out-of-
court lineup on defense motion when, in the exercise 
of its discretion, it deems such appropriate. Gener-
ally, such a lineup may be appropriate where the 
defendant, on timely motion, makes a showing that 
eyewitness identification is materially at issue and 
there exists in the particular case a -reasonable 
likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup 
would tend to resolve. Berryman v. U.S., 22 Crim. L. 
Rep. 2172 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977). 
Bail-Equal Protection Challenge 
Pretrial detainees brought an action challenging 
Florida's system of imposing bail on pretrial detain-
ees. The Court held that (1) when challenged on 
equal protection grounds, Florida's system of impos-
ing bail was subject to close judical scrutiny, (2) a 
state may not use bail to prevent the pretrial release 
of unreasonably dangerous persons, and (3) equal 
protection standards are not satisfied unless the 
judge is required to consider less financially onerous 
forms of release before he imposes money bail. This 
case a I so contains a •• extensive discussion of bail. 
Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Right to Counsel at Lineup 
A lineup does not end when the suspects file out of 
the room. Instead, such an identification procedure 
includes the witness' verbal or written assertion of 
whatever reaction he had to the viewing. Thus, the 
Court held that the 6th Amendment-based rule of 
U.S. v. Wade, which guarantees the right to counsel 
at a lineup occurring after an indictment or informa-
tion has been returned, requires that counsel be 
allowed to attend the witness-response stage of the 
ljneup as well as the viewing itself. State v. McGhee, 
350 So.2d 370 (La. Sup. Ct. 1977). Ed. Note: McGhee 
follows the decision of the California Supreme Court 
in People v. Willaims, 3 Cal.3d 853, 478 P.2d 942 
(1971 ). 
Affidavit for Probable Cause 
A negligent misstatement in a search warrant 
affidavit renders the affidavit invalid if it would not 
establish probable cause without the misstatement. 
The Court distinguished between "honest mistake" 
and negligent misstatements. Where the affidavit 
stated that inspection of suitcases had revealed 
marijuana when, in fact, the suitcases had not been 
opened, and the basis for detection was the odor 
coming from the suitcases, such was a negligent 
misstatement which did not establish probable 
cause. U.S. v. Astroff, 556 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Delay of Arrest 
There was an 11-month period between the date of 
the alleged offense and the date of the defendant's 
arrest. In determining whether this delay constituted 
a due process violation, the Court did not look solely 
to the time period. Several factors must be consid-
ered, including the reason the government offers to 
justify the delay. The key factor is prejudice to the 
accused. No matter how long the delay, it per se will 
not justify dismissal unless the accused can demon-
strate that he is prejudiced thereby. Prejudice is 
demonstrated where the defendant has no recol-
lection of what he was doing or where he was at the 
time of the offense, so as to locate any witness. State 
v. Griffin, 347 So.2d 692 (Fla. App. 1977). 
Discovery-Medical Records of 
Prosecution Witness 
Since the mental condition of the prosecuting 
victim was at issue, the defendant was entitled to 
discover medical and hospital records of the witness 
when she was a patient at a state hospital. The 
interests of justice require the privilege between 
patient and psychiatrist be withheld. Various meth-
ods which a court could employ to provide such 
discovery are discussed. The Court also approved an 
in camera inspection of the requested documents to 
determine if they had any probative value to the 
defendant. State v. Brown, 552 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. 
1977). 
Impeachment with Prior Convictions 
After a lengthy discussion of impeachment with 
prior convictions, the Court ruled that evidence of a 
prior conviction is not admissible to impeach the 
credibility of a criminal defendant except in prosecu-
'tions for perjury and false swearing. However, use of 
prior convictions is proper where the defendant affir-
matively introduces evidence of good character. 
State v. McAboy, 236, S.E.2d 431 (W.Va. 1977). 
Handcuffed Defendant 
It is error to take a juvenile before the juvenile court 
in handcuffs, even though no jury is involved, where 
there is no showing of threat of escape or that guards 
would not be sufficient. In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72 
(Ill. 1977) Ed. Note: See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 
U.S. 501 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held 
that compelling a defendant to wear prison garb 
during trial violated due process. 
Miranda Warnings 
The defendant made incriminatory statements fol-
lowing one-half hour of stationhouse interrogation 
during which time the detective talked to the defen-
dant about people they knew, unrelated events, and 
the victim. Miranda warnings were then given. By 
that time, however, the detective had persuaded the 
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defendant to talk. The Court held that such state-
ments should have been suppressed at trial. Miranda 
warnings must precede any custodial interrogation 
designed to obtain incriminatory statements. Where 
the waiver of rights results from the clever softening 
up of the defendant through disparagement of the 
victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent 
decision to waive must be deemed to be involuntary. 
People v. Honeycutt, 570 P.2d 1050 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 
1977). 
Miranda Warnings 
After his arrest, the defendant was given two 
Miranda warnings and he heeded his attorney's 
advice not to talk to the police. While in custody, 
however, he made incriminating statements to a 
guard after the guard assured him that anything he 
said would not be used against him. Despite the fact 
that such statements were voluntary, possessed 
indicia of reliability, and were not the result of any 
intentional violation of constitutional standards, the 
Court held that adherence to the spirit of various 
Supreme Court decisions required that such state-
ments be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Dustin, 22 
Crim. L. Rep. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1977). 
Informers-Disclosure of Identity 
An FBI agent was not permitted to testify at a 
sentencing hearing that two defendants belonged to 
a Mafia-like group without disclosing, upon demand 
by the defense, the identity of the informer· who 
allegedly supplied such information. For the court to 
base a critical decision affecting liberty upon infor-
mation from a person whom the government pre-
vents the defendant from examining, would violate 
both the due process and confrontation clauses. U.S. 
v. Fatica, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2286 (U.S.D.C. E.N.Y. 
1977). 
Declarations Against Penal Interest 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopts 
the approach taken by Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3) with regard to declarations against penal 
interest. Under the Federal Rules, a statement a-
gainst penal interest is admissible provided cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicate its trust-
worthiness. Commonwealth v. Carr, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 
2241 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1977). 
